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Abstract  
This paper examines the pattern of volatility in the call money rate and its association to monetary 
policy operations of Bangladesh Bank (BB). In the process, it explores empirical issues like the co-
movement of money market rates and the presence of heteroscedasticity in the call money rate. The 
first stage analysis supports the view that money market rates co-move and there is a co-integration 
relationship between overnight money market rate and BB's policy interest rates. At the second stage, 
long-run properties of the data were incorporated while trying to investigate the efficacy of 
operational policy of BB in the indirect policy regime by separating the short-run and long-run 
effects. As the variances of the error terms are not constant,, OLS estimation provides a false sense of 
precision. A GARCH model is therefore estimated which suggests that the operational policy of BB is 
effective in influencing the rate volatility in Bangladesh. The empirical evidence of this study will 
assist in better understanding the interest rate channel of monetary transmission, overnight money 
market behavior, and operational policy of BB.  
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1. Introduction 
With economic reforms and financial liberalization, Bangladesh started to put greater 
reliance on a market based financial system since the early 1990s. Overtime, among others, 
administered interest rate structures have been abolished and deregulation in the banking 
sector has taken place. Accordingly, Bangladesh Bank (BB), the central bank of the country, 
started reinforcing indirect monetary policy operations. The transition to this framework has 
been accompanied by some indirect monetary policy arrangements, namely repo (repurchase 
agreement), reverse repo and interbank repo from July 2002, April 2003, and July 2003 
respectively. Bangladesh also entered into a floating exchange rate system in May 2003. All 
these developments have generated a profound influence over the functioning and 
development of the country’s money market. Through time, an increasing focus has also 
been given to monitor the day-to-day activities in the overnight money market (call money 
market) in order to pursue a prudent monetary policy by the central bank.2 
There are various reasons why central banks around the world pay greater attention to the 
stability of the call money market. It is generally viewed that the uncertainty caused by 
volatility in the call money rate3 gives confusing signals to the market participants about the 
stance of the monetary policy. In addition, as other interest rates in the money market come 
with different lags, it is the call money rate, which the central bankers and market 
participants can monitor on a daily basis. It is also believed that volatility in the overnight 
money market can be radiated out to other money market rates as these rates reflect the 
underlying changes in marginal cost of borrowing.  
In a market where overnight rates fluctuate from a very high to a very low end, market 
players, especially banks, are encouraged to keep higher excess reserve than under normal 
situation to meet the uncertainties and can even be reluctant to purchase near cash  assets like 
bills and bonds from the primary market. The situation exacerbates if there is no active 
secondary market for bills and bonds where banks can easily convert those to cash 
reasonably quickly. In such a situation, open market operations (OMOs) conducted by the 
central bank may not be such effective as to influence the excess liquidity in the market.   
Volatility can also be transmitted to foreign exchange market; the difficulty specially arises 
when both the call money and foreign exchange markets are in pressure. In case of shortage 
of liquidity and/or higher demand for liquidity, central bank usually injects money to 
minimize the deviation of call rate from its policy interest rates. In such a situation, the 
injection of liquidity may in turn increase the demand side pressure in the foreign exchange 
market, creating a possibility of the exchange rate to depreciate further. In Bangladesh, a 
situation like this happened in the second half of FY06, when the weighted average daily call 
money rate varied between 7.07 percent and 40.37 percent and the monthly average call rate 
ranged between 10.84 percent and 21.54 percent. However, this was the period when foreign 
exchange market was also under pressure; BB found difficulties in injecting fresh money for 
the fear of deterioration in the domestic currency value.  
                                                 
2 Theoretically, call money market is the institutional arrangement where short-term funds flow from banks and 
other financial institutions holding excess liquidity to banks and financial institutions in need of immediate 
funds without any collateral security. Call money market is synonymously used as overnight money market in 
different occasions.  
3 Call money rate is the interest rate, which is determined in the call money market. Throughout the paper, call 
money rate is synonymously used as call rate, overnight money market rate, and overnight rate.     
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Call money rate for overnight transactions reflects the demand for and supply of liquidity in 
the market. Therefore, the use of monetary policy instruments to influence the liquidity 
position in the market places a substantial impact on the rate. A common objective of the 
central bank's monetary policy is thus to minimize the persistent deviations of the overnight 
money market rates. It is therefore expected day-to-day implementation of monetary policy is 
linked to the stability of the overnight money market rate. On the other side, if market 
participants find that the central bank's operational measures can effectively control the 
movement of market rates then they incorporate the belief into their demand. Obviously, the 
success of this process depends on the effectiveness of the transmission channel of the 
interest rates. However, if such success holds, credibility of the central bank would be 
enhanced, which further helps policy measures to become more effective.  It is also argued 
that central banks can use open mouth operations (signaling) rather than any actual 
interventions to keep market rates at a target level, if such credibility holds (Guthrie and 
Wright 2000). Some studies also suggest that interest rates tend to move together, especially 
in the long run, and there is a tendency that market-clearing rates converge towards the 
central banks' rate for open market operations.    
Given the above reasons, there is a common objective of a central bank's operational policy 
to minimize the persistent deviations of the overnight money market rate(s) from its policy 
rates. This study investigates whether the choice of operational framework of monetary 
policy has been related to the pattern of call money rate in Bangladesh. In order to do so, we 
first examine the long-run relationship between call money rate and 28-day Treasury bill (T-
bill) rate. We have chosen these two rates because of their importance and visibility in the 
short run money market in the country. Call money rate is the market-clearing rate and an 
information variable in the process of implementing monetary policy while 28-day T-bill rate 
is the default risk free rate in the Bangladesh money market. Having investigated the long-
run relationship between these two important rates, we then build up an empirical model that 
captures the feature of the data, in particular the time-varying nature of volatility, in order to 
investigate the efficacy of various monetary policy arrangements to stabilize the volatility in 
the call money rate. The empirical results presented in the paper have important implications 
for monetary policy, particularly with respect to the interest rate channel of monetary 
transmission. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Following the introduction in section 1, section 2 
reviews some previous studies in this area in the context of Bangladesh and some other 
countries. Section 3 discusses the practices of monetary policy operations and various factors 
influencing volatility in the call money rate. Section 4 enumerates some stylized facts and 
statistical characteristics of the data and section 5 incorporates the empirical analysis. Finally, 
section 6 offers the conclusions and recommendations.    
2. Review of Previous Studies 
In recent decades, a significant body of empirical research has emerged on the behavior of 
the call money market and its relationship with monetary policy in the context of developed 
countries; the empirical research on the issue is however scarce in the context of developing 
countries like Bangladesh. This is probably because of the underdevelopment of the money 
market or non-following an interest rate targeting for monetary policy operations.  In 
addition, unlike monetary target, interest rate channel is not well understood. Nevertheless, 
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movements in the interest rates have a profound impact on businesses and economic 
activities in any country, therefore studies in this regard can bring out important policy 
implications.  
In Bangladesh, few studies that so far have been done on the issue are descriptive in nature 
and ignore various statistical properties of data. The studies, in general, attempted to study 
the sources and impacts of fluctuations in the call money rate and implications of the trend of 
the market behavior (see, for example, Sarker 1999; Akhtaruzzaman, Mahfuza and 
Masuduzzman 2005). These studies, however, enumerate some important observations and 
recommendations to facilitate further development of call money market and to limit 
fluctuations. These include, enforcing indicative limits on individual banks to restrict their 
exposure in inter-bank transactions, which draw funds disproportionately to their capital or 
deposit base.       
Sarno and Thornton (2002) investigate the dynamic relationship between two important 
short-term interest rates in US financial markets-the federal funds rate and the 3-month T-bill 
rate using a general non-linear asymmetric vector equilibrium correlation model (ECM). 
Regardless of whether the argument that federal funds rate and T-bill rate move together 
because they are linked as the expectations hypothesis (EH)4 holds, finding of their empirical 
results provide strong evidence of a co-integrating relationship between the federal funds rate 
and the T-bill rate.  
Wetherilt (2002) examines whether the choice of policy instruments and other reforms to 
Bank of England's money market operations affect the Bank's objective of minimizing 
persistent deviations of the relevant money market rates(s) from its policy rate using daily 
money market rates, ranging from the overnight to twelve-month maturity. The author 
developed an empirical modeling framework, namely a single equation component GARCH 
model, to analyze the dynamic behavior of overnight and other short-term rates and a vector 
error correction model (VECM) to analyze the dynamic interactions between the entire 
spectrum of short-term rates. This model captures the time varying nature of volatility of the 
key money market rates i.e., the overnight and two-week rate. The study demonstrates that 
higher spreads between the two-week market rate and the official repo rate result in lower 
money market volatility and rate dynamics at the short end of the money market curve, and 
hence, the effects at the longer end are much weaker.  
Palombini (2003) found that the in the Italian interbank market, largest increase in volatility 
and the most notable variations of its intraday pattern occur at the last working day of reserve 
maintenance period and at the end of each quarter. Furthermore, he found that overnight 
interest rate volatility is not influenced by trading volume. This finding indicates the 
difference between a financial market, where interest rate level is determined by information 
arrival and the market for overnight liquidity, where the volume of trading is more influenced 
by institutional factors like the functioning of the payment system.  
 
Joshi (2004) assesses the volatility pattern of the call money rate in India to estimate its 
sensitivity vis-à-vis the Reserve Bank of India's liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) decisions. 
                                                 
4 According to the expectation hypothesis of the term structure of interest rate, it is assumed that the T-bill rate 
is equal to the market's expectation for the federal funds rate over the term of the T-bill rate plus a risk 
premium. 
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Moreover, he attempted to show how regulatory changes related to other instruments in the 
money market might have affected the functioning of the inter-bank money market. He used 
Nelson Beveridge (NB) time series decomposition and an ARCH-M [1,1] model. The NB 
decomposition is used to differentiate between permanent and cyclical components in a time 
series while ARCH imposes a systematic structure to the variance process making it 
amenable to interpretation and use in forecasting. The evidence provided by the empirical 
model brings out that while the call money rate is tracked reasonably accurately during 
surplus liquidity conditions, the predictive power suffers a loss when liquidity shortage 
suddenly emerges. In addition, it argues that introducing a wider range of eligible collateral 
in the repo market could help in improving the efficiency of interest rate targeting.     
The above review provides some empirical evidence toward understanding the behavior of 
overnight money market rates, and implications of monetary policy measures in maintaining 
the rate stability. Two important findings are noteworthy in view of the present study. One is 
that money market rates are interlinked and there exit long-run relationships between money 
market rates and policy rate of the central bank. The other is that recent arrangements of the 
indirect monetary policy operations place significant impact of the movement of overnight 
money market rates. In addition, identifying and capturing the time varying nature of 
volatility in the empirical models is an important lesson for the methodology part of this 
study.  
3.  Overnight Money Market and Monetary Policy Operations in Bangladesh  
The large swings in the overnight call money rates are usually not isolated occurrences, but 
are stemmed from overall economic activity and conduct of day-to-day monetary policy 
operations by the central bank. In influencing interest rates, BB has a choice of instruments 
grouped under three headings: Open Market Operations (OMOs), discount window, and 
reserve requirements. The procedures that BB employs in using these instruments to 
implement monetary policy affect the demand and supply conditions in the inter-bank market 
for short-term funds, which forms part of money market named market for bank reserves, 
where banks and other financial institutions trade in their reserve balances at BB to meet 
intraday liquidity needs.5 The call money rate arises, in large part, as an interaction of the 
demand for and supply of bank reserves jointly determined by the optimizing behavior of the 
money market participants and of the BB and the efficient distribution of reserves throughout 
the banking system. 
Banks settle transactions among each other on the books of the central bank. The bank 
reserves-banks balances at the central bank- are the ultimate means of settlement. Therefore, 
banks have a demand for reserve balances that arise firstly from the demand for required 
reserve in order to fulfill legal reserve requirement, the portion of reserve balance that BB 
requires the banks to maintain.6 Secondly, demand for reserve balances arises from demand 
                                                 
5 In the rest of this article the term ‘banks’ will generally be used to cover both banks and other financial 
institutions who take time deposits and are required to maintain a certain portion of their deposit liabilities as 
statutory reserve. 
6 The BB regulation requires that the banks and non-bank financial institutions licensed from the Bank be 
required to maintain a certain percent of their deposit liabilities as statutory reserve. Presently BB requires the 
scheduled banks to maintain 18 percent of their deposits as Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), where Cash 
Reserve Requirement (CRR) must be kept at the rate of 5 percent on daily average on two-week basis but no 
less than 4 percent on any day. Non-bank financial institutions who take term deposits are required to maintain 
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for excess reserve. Excess reserve is the portion of reserve-balance that banks willingly keep 
in order to settle transactions among themselves and between their customers, which takes 
place through the transfers from the account of one bank at BB to that of another bank. The 
demand for bank reserves affected by opportunity cost of holding reserves i.e. market interest 
rate, expectations of future market interest rate, and the cost of avoiding default.  
A required reserve is calculated as a proportion of average level of deposits held over a 
month, called the reserve computation period. The calculated amount of reserve requirement 
must be satisfied on average over a two-week period, called reserve maintenance period. BB, 
like most other central banks, builds a lag between the computation period and the 
maintenance period where the reserve maintenance period follows the reserve calculation 
period. The lagged reserve accounting system helps the banks to estimate accurately their 
reserve demand for a maintenance period.  
From August 2004, BB allowed reserve-averaging system within a maintenance period with 
a limitation that the daily reserve balance must not remain below a minimum requirement 
level.7 The reserve averaging provision in bank reserves permits individual banks to enjoy 
considerable flexibility to manage their daily accounts and to use part of their reserves to 
offset short-term or seasonal fluctuations in liquidity. This flexibility in turn provides greater 
interest rate sensitivity in the demand for bank reserves during the early and the middle part 
of the maintenance period. Because required balance is met on a two-week daily average 
basis, banks can substitute balance across days. For example, if a bank finds itself with 
balance above the average requirement level on a particular day, it can offset the surplus 
balance by holding lower balances (but not below the minimum levels) on subsequent days in 
reserve maintenance period. Similarly, if a bank finds itself with balance below the average 
requirement level on a particular day, it can make it up on subsequent days in the reserve 
maintenance period. This ability to adjust reserve holdings across a maintenance period eases 
the pressure on banks to borrow or lend on a single day, reducing the possibility that supply 
and demand forces will cause call money rate to fluctuate abruptly.  
Banks, however, would be indifferent about the amount of reserves they hold if they expect 
no significant fluctuations in the inter bank rate. Moreover, they may be cautious to deviate 
from the average level of reserve position they maintain for the fear of not being able to 
adjust their position as the number of days remaining in the maintenance period reduces. As a 
result, the demand for bank reserves tends to be interest inelastic especially at the end of the 
reserve maintenance period. In contrast, if the banks are maintaining a higher balance 
requirement, they would face less risk of an end-of day balance below required level and 
have more flexibility to postpone purchases of funds within the maintenance period. If 
enough banks are in low reserve positions or when payment flows in the banking system are 
heavy because of seasonality, a distributional imbalance of funds among banks or an 
aggregate surplus or shortage of funds is more likely to trigger volatility in the call money 
rate (Bennell and Hilton 1997). 
                                                                                                                                                       
rate of 5 percent of total liabilities as SLR, of which 2.54 percent of term deposit must be kept as CRR on daily 
average on bi-weekly basis but no less than 2 percent on a day. 
7 According to reserve averaging provision, banks are required to keep with Bangladesh Bank cash reserve 
requirement daily at the rate of 5 percent of their average deposit liabilities on two-week basis provided that the 
amount of cash reserve would not be less than 4 percent in any day effective from 10 October 2005. 
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With lagged reserve accounting, total reserve in a given period-the bulk of which are 
required reserve-are essentially predetermined by the level of deposits one month earlier. As 
changes in demand for bank reserves arise mainly from changes in reserve requirement, 
hence demand for bank reserves does not fluctuate considerably over a shorter period. 
Therefore, it is the supply factors, which mainly affect the equilibrium interest rate in the 
market over a short run. As the supply factors are largely influenced by various monetary 
policy operations including OMOs, central banks do have enough control over the movement 
of the equilibrium interest rates in the market. Therefore, the movements of the interest rates 
are strongly linked with the daily conduct of monetary policy operations by central bank in 
the short end.   
The supply of bank reserves in a single day is determined by BB's holding of government 
securities, borrowing by banks from BB, and autonomous supply of bank reserves, if no 
OMOs are conducted. Some of the transactions causing liquidity flows are pre-known to BB; 
these include, among others, holding of government. securities i.e. repo, reverse repo and T-
bills etc. However, transactions like changes in currency demand and transfer of public funds 
to and from BB are referred to as autonomous supply, which is not pre-known by BB at the 
time of conducting OMOs. 
In addition to sudden autonomous changes in liquidity, some seasonal factors cause 
significant day-to-day variations in the central bank's balance sheet, disrupt the central bank’s 
management of liquidity, and lead to lower degree of precision of liquidity projections. As a 
result, in anticipating the supply condition, projection of autonomous flow of liquidity 
(autonomous supply of bank reserves) arising from various transaction of BB with the rest of 
the economic system is very important in determining the market clearing rates.    
In implementing daily OMOs, BB attempts to ensure that the supply of balances satisfies 
demand at a rate consistent with its policy interest rates. BB makes estimates of the changes 
in factors affecting its balance sheet and causing autonomous supply of bank reserves in 
order to project the quantity of reserves that would be available before conducting any 
OMOs. BB at the same time predicts demand for bank reserves to achieve its operational 
objective. The excess reserves prior to BBs liquidity operations could then be estimated ex 
ante by taking differences in demand and supply of bank reserves. BB considers these 
differences in order to assess the required scale of its intervention in the money market 
through daily OMOs.  
If the demand for bank reserves exceeds the supply, BB judges that it needs to make more 
reserves available and it will add reserves through open market purchase i.e. lending more 
that the counterparties have to repay in OMOs maintaining on that day. If demand is less than 
supply of bank reserves, BB drains reserves through an open market sale i.e. lending less 
than the amount the counterparties are repaying. BB thus offsets the deviations by injecting 
(withdrawing) liquidity into the banking system in an equivalent amount and thus bring the 
amount of reserve money expansion in line with its target so that supply of broad money can 
be kept under control. Therefore, while BB with its OMOs directly affects the amount of 
liquidity in the market by shifting the supply curve, it can also affect the slope of the demand 
curve by changing the reserve requirement. Through reserve requirements and conducting 
appropriate OMOs, BB affects demand for or supply of bank reserves or both, thereby 
limiting the fluctuations in the equilibrium rate in the market.    
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4. Data and Stylized Facts  
Figure1 portrays the movement of interbank call money rate and the 28-day T-bill rate for the 
last one decade. The figures reveal that the call rates have been highly volatile since 2002 as 
compared with the historical average followed by an unprecedented stability in FY07. Table 
1 shows that the average call rate and standard deviation were highest in 2006. Weighted 
average call rate during the last ten years varied from 4.25 percent to 21.54 percent. On a 
yearly basis, starting from 8.66 percent in 1997, the mean call rate dropped in the following 
three consecutive years and reached at 7.31 percent in 2000, then rose again to 9.18 percent 
in 2002 before touching the bottom at 5.91 percent in 2004-the lowest ever in the entire 
period. The call rate again rose sharply to 11.10 percent in 2006 along with substantial 
increase in volatility.  
Figure 1: Historical Evolution of Call Money (daily) and 28-day T-bill Rates: Jan 1997 to Jun 2007 
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          Source: Bangladesh Bank  
Month-by-month analysis for the period 1997 to 2007 suggests that call rates have an upward 
trend starting from March to June and the standard deviations are high in these months 
(Table 1). Thereafter, a gradual downward movement sets in up to November. After a brief 
slowdown, the rates again move up for the month in December for the practice of ‘window 
dressing’ by the commercial banks. From January to March, the rates gently firm up again. 
As compared with the 28-day T-bill rate, it is apparent from Figure 1 that call money rate 
was lower than the policy rate on different occasions, especially in the earlier periods.  
However, this is the daily call rate, which went below the central bank policy rate in different 
individual days; the monthly average call rate always remains above the 28-day T-bill rate in 
Bangladesh (Table 1). 
One important fact regarding the pattern of call money rate is that the variance does not 
remain constant over the periods. As can be seen from Figure 2, volatility in the call money 
rate follows clustering at some particular points of time; there are periods of high volatility 
followed by periods of low volatility. In recent years, volatility in the call rate saw a break 
during Feb-Jun 2003. This is the period when the floating exchange rate system was 
introduced in Bangladesh.8 In the period immediately before the change, BB tightened 
liquidity in the market as a precautionary measure to curb speculative tendencies in the 
                                                 
8 Bangladesh stepped into fully market based exchange rate effective from 31 May 2003.  
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foreign exchange market. Because of tight OMOs, the overnight money market interest rates 
faced additional pressure and reached high levels. From the end of 2004, the call rate, 
however, became volatile, which continued during the whole of the first quarter and a part of 
the second quarter of 2005. In this period, the central bank tightened liquidity in the market 
as it found problems relating to the prices of essentials and balance of payment situation 
more pressing. In 2006, the call money rate remained relatively unstable in the first half 
before settling down in the second half.9  
Table 1: Monthly Weighted Average Call Money Rate: Jan 1997- Jun 2006 
Month 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 AVG SD 
January 6.1 9.2 8.2 7.9 7.6 9.0 7.9 9.7 11.4 14.9 7.3 9.0 2.4
February 7.9 8.7 9.0 6.9 9.0 16.8 15.0 5.9 12.0 12.1 6.9 10.0 3.5
March 7.3 8.2 8.8 7.1 11.6 10.2 10.0 5.7 13.9 14.6 7.0 9.5 2.9
April 9.6 11.8 7.6 6.5 11.2 10.4 8.2 5.0 12.3 21.5 7.5 10.1 4.4
May 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.2 9.9 15.7 14.1 6.6 16.0 15.2 7.6 10.9 3.6
June 13.3 10.6 9.4 8.7 11.7 9.1 12.1 5.4 6.8 10.8 7.7 9.6 2.4
July 7.5 6.7 6.4 5.7 5.9 4.3 5.1 5.0 5.5 7.6  5.9 1.1
August 8.5 7.5 6.3 6.2 6.7 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.9 7.5  6.4 1.1
September 8.6 8.2 7.9 6.6 7.2 6.6 5.5 5.1 6.1 7.4  6.9 1.1
October 9.5 8.5 6.8 7.0 7.6 6.7 5.2 5.5 7.2 7.3  7.1 1.3
November 7.6 7.9 7.0 8.2 5.7 6.7 6.4 6.0 8.2 7.2  7.1 0.9
December 9.4 7.9 6.8 8.7 12.0 9.8 5.6 5.9 8.4 7.1  8.1 1.9
AVG 8.7 8.6 7.7 7.3 8.8 9.2 8.4 5.9 9.5 11.1    
SD 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.0 2.4 3.9 3.6 1.3 3.5 4.7    
             Source: Bangladesh Bank 
Figure 2: Conditional Standard Deviation of Weekly Average Call Rate (Jan 1997-Jun 2007) 
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Co-movement of repo, reverse-repo, T-bill and call money rates in recent years  
While BB traditionally conducts the weekly T-bill auction as part of OMOs, recent 
developments regarding monetary policy measures are the introduction of repo (repurchase 
agreement), reverse repo and interbank repo operations. Figure 3 shows the monthly trend of 
T-bill rate, 1-2 day repo rate, 1-2 day reverse repo rate and the call money rate. The first 
                                                 
9 For details on recent pattern in call money market, see Bangladesh Bank (2006, 2007).    
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three rates emerge from an auction process at BB and the call money rate is determined in the 
marketplace. While all the four rates positively correlate with each other, the call money rate 
has the highest correlation with the 1-2 day repo rate (0.67, Table 2). However, the 
correlation coefficient between call money rate and 1-2 day repo rate is still less than perfect 
because of the withholding of repo operations by BB for most of the periods since June 2005 
because of tight monetary policy. Again, 28-day T-Bill rate shows high correlation with repo 
and reverse repo rates, where for the latter the correlation coefficient is close to unity. This is 
because both the instruments are used to mop-up excess liquidity from the market through 
the auction process with participating agents.   
Figure 3: Overnight Money Market Rates (Jul 2002- Jun 2007) 
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Source: Monetary Policy Department and Economic Trends, BB 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients among Various Money Market Rates (Jul 2002- Jun 2007) 
Call rate
1-2 day Repo 
Rate 
1-2 day Reverse 
Repo rate T-bill rate
Call rate 1.00
1-2 day Repo Rate 0.67 1.00
1-2 day Reverse Repo rate 0.27 0.68 1.00
T-bill rate 0.34 0.75 0.96 1.00  
Generally, it can be said that all the four rates are closely linked with each other, which 
suggests that money market rates co-move in Bangladesh. Recent studies also suggest that 
the 28-day bill rate is highly correlated with repo and reverse repo rate (see, Shahiduzzaman 
and Naser 2007). Therefore, the 28-day T-bill rate can be used as a good proxy of central 
bank policy changes regarding monetary policy operations, especially for the period prior to 
the separation of debt management from monetary management, which took place only 
recently.10  
 
                                                 
10 The volume auctions introduced from September 2006 have segregated the BB's role in government debt 
management from its monetary policy operations. Auction of government T-bills and bonds are being held only 
for government debt management. On the other hand, to perform monetary policy operations, Bangladesh Bank 
re-introduced 30-day and 91-day Bangladesh Bank bills from October 2006 as its own monetary policy 
instrument. 
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5. Empirical Analysis  
The total sample for the study is weekly average data covering the period 1 January1997 to 
30 June 2007. However, data for all variables are not available for the whole sample period 
because of their inception in the recent period.  As BB introduced repo arrangement in July 
2002 and reverse repo in April 2003, data for these variables are available after these 
periods. In addition, Bangladesh entered into the floating exchange rate regime on 31 May 
2003, which is an important event in the money market development. While under the 
floating exchange rate system, the market is expected to bring about any necessary 
adjustment in the exchange rate, the central bank is left with the residual responsibility to 
smoothen the short-term volatility in the exchange rate. Therefore, under the changing 
scenario BB has to keep a close eye on the foreign exchange market while trying to maintain 
stability in the overnight money market.  
Our estimated models are constraint by the availability of data for the variables in 
consideration. The first model is for the full sample period, which investigates the long-run 
relationship between call money rate and 28-day T-bill rate using cointegration and 
equilibrium correction models. Cointegration and equilibrium correlation modeling 
techniques provide effective tools to investigate the relationship between interest rates: the 
forces that generate a long-run equilibrium relationship between rates of different maturities 
imply mean reversion of the spread and the existence of an equilibrium correlation model 
(ECM). Empirically, the central bank's ability to change interest rates through day-to-day 
monetary policy can be checked by means of a test for cointegration between short and long 
run term interest rates in vector error correction form.  
The second model is a single equation model for the sub-sample of Nov 2002 to Jun 2007, 
which investigates the effectiveness of various monetary policy measures on the stability of 
the call money rate. The second model is thus a first difference dependent variable model, 
which particularly deals with the volatility issue and efficacy of monetary policy operations 
of BB. The choice of variables for the second model needs further discussion. Like the first 
model, 28-day T-bill rate has been taken as a proxy of the central bank’s policy interest rate. 
The 28-day T-bill rate emerges from the weekly auction procedure at BB. A better measure 
of the central bank’s policy interest rate could be repo or the reverse repo rate. However, 
neither the repo rate nor the reverse repo rate is available on a continuous basis; repo and 
reverse repo operations at the central bank are held only sporadically. Therefore, there would 
be a significant reduction in the number of observation if we consider repo or reverse rates as 
a proxy of policy rate. Secondly, there are different maturities of repo and reverse repo bids 
and rates differ for different maturities. In each auction day, there may be the case that BB 
accepts one-day bid but in another day, it accepts 7-day bid or both. Therefore, weighted 
average rates between two auction dates can differ significantly, which compelled us to use 
the 28-day rate as a measure of central bank’s policy stance. In addition, the T-bill rate is 
highly correlated with the reverse repo rate and it does reflect the monetary policy stance of 
the central bank.  
The monetary policy framework of BB requires reliance on monetary targeting focused on 
the reserve money as the operating target. Therefore, BB follows a quantitative approach in 
monetary programming to routinely (indeed on a daily basis) monitor and influence the 
position of excess liquidity in the banking system. In this backdrop, quantity accepted in the 
repo and reverse repo operations seems to have direct impact on the stability of the overnight 
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money market. Accordingly, we included the repo and reverse repo in volumes in the model 
to investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy operations to overnight money market 
stability. Other explanatory variables in the second model, among others include, excess 
liquidity in the banking system and exchange rate in terms of US dollar. In order to capture 
the effects of two Eid festivals, we use a seasonal dummy in the model. We also try to 
incorporate the end-days effects of the reserve maintenance period to the volatility of the 
money market by incorporating dummy variables. All variables except the dummy variables 
are in natural log form. After experimenting with a number of variables, the final variables 
for the empirical study are as follows:  
 
cr        weekly average call money rate 
tr        28 day T-bill rate on weekly basis 
re       log of  weekly average excess reserve in the banking system in taka million 
rei      log of  weekly average repo volume in taka million 
rrei    log of weekly average reverse repo volume in taka million 
xe      weekly average exchange rate 
SD     seasonal dummy 
RD    dummy for reserve maintenance period  
5.1 Unit Root Test   
At the first stage, we investigate the time series properties of the data. We begin this by 
looking at the line graph and autocorrelation (called as correlogram) for the weekly call 
money rate, the principal variable of the study.  Figure 1 and Appendix Table 1 present the 
line graph of weekly call rate (cr) and the correlogram function respectively. The mean value 
declines sharply in 2004 before going up in 2005 and 2006 (Table 1). In Figure 2, even 
though the series seems generally mean reverting, a deeper look reveals that the mean 
actually does not remain constant over time. In addition, the call money rate exhibits an 
upward bias so that the mean is not constant over time. The autocorrelation function 
(Appendix 1) declines as the number of lags become large, but only very slowly. 
Furthermore, the partial autocorrelation (PAC) is as high as 0.67 at lag 1. We would therefore 
suspect that cr series is non-stationary. However, in order to decide formally whether the 
series is a I(0) or I(1) process, we follow the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979).  
If ADF test statistics of the co-efficient is smaller (in absolute terms) than the corresponding 
critical value (in absolute terms), the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root cannot be 
rejected, and thus the conclusion is that the series is not stationary. Then the series is tested 
whether it is I (1) or (integrated of order one) or of a higher order. The lagged structure of 
this study is decided by using Akaike information criterion. Table 2 reports the result of unit 
root tests for each variable under study using ADF.  
The lag length for the test is determined by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The ADF 
test results indicate that we are unable to reject the call money rate (cr) series at 1 percent 
level of significance, while the 28-day T-bill rate (tr) is not rejected at both 1 percent and 5 
percent levels of significance.   
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Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Tests 
  Lag length    
Model 1: Sample 1997-2007  
cr Intercept 49 -1.27 
∆cr Intercept 49 -7.42 
1%- (-3.44 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
tr Intercept 5 -2.01 
∆tr Intercept 5 -11.07 
1%- (-3.44 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
Model 2: Sample 2002-2007 
cr Intercept 12 -2.88 
∆cr Intercept 12 -5.72 
1%- (-3.46 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
tr Intercept 5 -1.96 
∆tr Intercept 5 -3.83 
1%- (-3.46 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
lre Intercept 4 -1.99 
∆lre Intercept 4 -9.11 
1%- (-3.46 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
xr Intercept and trend 1 -2.43 
∆xr Intercept and trend 1 -10.06 
1%- (-4.0 ) 
5%- (-3.43) 
rei None 3 -4.92 
∆rei None 3 -11.55 
1%- (-2.57 ) 
5%- (-1.94) 
rrei None 3 -1.64 
∆rrei None 3 -9.01 
1%- (-3.46 ) 
5%- (-2.87) 
            Note: ∆ is the first difference operator.  
5.2 Long Run Relationship  
A general argument regarding the movement of money market interest rates is that they tend 
to move together. This can also be true if we consider two important short-term interest rates 
in the market-the call money rate and 28-day T-bill rate. Empirically, several empirical 
studies have tried to investigate the co-integrating or long run relationship between federal 
fund rate and T-bill rate in the US (see Sarno and Thornton 2002; Ruderbusch 1995).  
As mentioned earlier, there is hardly any empirical evidence on the long-run relationship 
between call money rate and T-bill rate in Bangladesh. To explore the relationship, we go for 
co-integration analysis between cr and tr. In this case, following a common shock, co-
integrated series gradually convergence to their long run relationship(s) (Johansen 1988, 
1991).  
Johansen developed two test statistics, namely the maximum eigenvalue test and trace test,   
to determine the number of cointegration vectors. The test results for the present study are 
presented in Table 3. In our case, both the trace statistics and Max-Eigenvalue statistics 
indicate that there is at least one co-integrating vector between cr and tr at 1 percent 
significance level. Therefore, there is a long run equilibrium relationship between the call 
money rate and 28-day T-bill rate.  The co-integrating relationship by normalizing on cr is 
presented in Table 4. According to the above equation, the coefficient of tr is significant at 1 
percent level. The adjustment coefficient of the equation is signed correctly. The coefficient 
is -0.47, which indicates that 47 percent of the deviation from long run equilibrium is 
corrected within one week.  
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Table 3: Johansen Co-integration Test Results 
Trace Test 
Hypothesized    Test  5 percent 1 percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigen value statistic critical value critical value 
None    0.064   40.1   19.96  24.60 
At most 1    0.015  7.4     9.24   12.97 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels  
     
Max-Eigenvalue Test 
Hypothesized    Test  5 percent 1 percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue statistic critical value critical value 
None    0.064   32.71   15.67   20.20 
At most 1    0.015   7.39    9.24   12.97 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels 
 
Table 4: Cointegration Equation 
CR TR C 
 1.00 -0.47 -1.22 
  (0.15)  (0.27) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
5.2 Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Operations   
The empirical evidence in the preceding section provides evidence that call money rate and 
T-bill rate co-move in the long- run. This type of finding provides an important step toward 
understanding the transmission of changes in central bank's policy rates to other interest rates 
in the market. However, this is also important to investigate how the day-to-day monetary 
policy operations by BB affect the volatility in the call money market in Bangladesh. In 
section 3, we discussed various factors that influence the volatility, e.g., excess liquidity 
position, repo and reverse repo operations, reserve maintenance period, seasonal factors, and 
exchange rate. Incorporating various explanatory variables, a general model is written as:  
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Where i is the number of different lags, Z is a set of control variables like position of excess 
reserve and exchange rate, and D represents the set of dummy variables like effect of reserve 
maintenance period and effect of Eid festival(s).  
The above model can be transformed into the following first difference form11: 
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Where,  
1,1 110211 −++=−= βδδλβλ and  
                                                 
11  See Appendix 2 for detailed derivation. 
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Equation 1 separates the short run from long run effects and models the change in cr as an 
autoregressive process. This kind of transformation helps to identify the effects of several 
policy measures. It includes the error correction term, which captures the adjustment of call 
money rate to its divergence from the policy rate. Because BB introduced repo and reverse 
repo arrangements in the recent past, our sample period is from November 2002 to June 2007 
using weekly data. 
Because of the high frequency weekly data, we tried different lags from 1 to 12. Then by 
sequentially eliminating insignificant terms or un-interpretable signs, the model was derived 
using the ordinary least square methodology (estimated equation 1). All the variables in 
equation 1 are highly significant having expected sign. However, since two explanatory 
variables, namely the exchange rate and dummy for reserve maintenance period, were not 
significant, they were dropped from the estimated equation. The reason behind the reserve 
maintenance period being not statistically significant is probably the use of weekly data, in 
which the day effects are averaged out. The adjusted R-square is 0.39, which is higher in the 
case of difference equation. The serial correlation LM test statistics reported in Table 5 do 
not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order twenty.  
However, before proceeding further in interpreting the estimated coefficients and in 
describing the summary statistics, it is important to check whether any ARCH effect exists in 
the residual (as described in section 4). There may be the case where the variance of cr does 
not remain constant over the sample period, e.g. the presence of particular kind of 
heteroscedasticity in which the variance of the regression error depends on the volatility of 
the errors of the recent past.  The ARCH test results, reported in Table 6, strongly suggest the 
presence of ARCH in the residuals. In such a situation, the regression coefficients under an 
ordinary least squares regression can give a false sense of precision (Engle 2001). 
Estimated Equation 1: Using Ordinary Least Squares Method 
Dependent Variable: DLCR 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 12/07/2002 to 6/16/2007 
Included observations: 237 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.132 0.098 -1.345 0.179 
LCR(-1)-LTR(-1) -0.288 0.051 -5.619 0.000 
LCR(-2) -0.127 0.068 -1.877 0.061 
LCR(-3) 0.197 0.057 3.458 0.000 
DLTR 1.994 0.753 2.647 0.009 
LREPI 0.036 0.006 5.792 0.000 
LREPI(-2) -0.016 0.005 -3.396 0.000 
LRREPI -0.012 0.007 -1.715 0.088 
LRREPI(-1) 0.015 0.007 2.079 0.038 
DLRE -0.158 0.044 -3.533 0.000 
DLRE(-1) -0.092 0.046 -2.002 0.046 
SD 0.077 0.045 1.708 0.089 
R-squared 0.418     Mean dependent var -0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.389     S.D. dependent var 0.279 
S.E. of regression 0.218     Akaike info criterion -0.159 
Sum squared resid 10.69     Schwarz criterion 0.016 
Log likelihood 30.84     F-statistic 14.68 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.125     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
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Table 5: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 1.044     Probability 0.411 
Obs*R-squared 32.810     Probability 0.331 
 
Table 6: ARCH Test Result 
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 9.993     Probability 0.002 
Obs*R-squared 9.666     Probability 0.002 
A widely used approach to handle this kind of problem is to follow the Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.12 The GARCH model is an 
extension of original ARCH model introduced by Engle (1982). The central focus of the 
GARCH model is that the variances of the error terms are not equal in all points or ranges of 
the data. The ARCH/ GARCH model solves the problem by estimating a variance equation, 
which contains three components, a constant, last period volatility (the ARCH term), and the 
last period variance (the GARCH term). The autoregressive root, which governs the 
persistence of volatility shocks, is the sum of coefficients of ARCH (1) and GARCH (1); if 
the sum is very close to unity then the shocks die out rather slowly. With little modification 
of original OLS model, the GARCH (1, 1) estimation result is presented in estimated 
equation 2. In order to check if there exists any remaining ARCH effect in the residual, we 
perform the ARCH test again. The ARCH test result presented in Table 8 suggests that there 
is no remaining ARCH effect in the model.   
Estimated equation 2 suggests that both the repo and reverse repo operations have useful 
implications for the movement of the call money rate. As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh 
Bank usually performs repo operations when the call money market becomes tight. This is 
reflected in the positive relation of call money rate and repo issue in present. However, the 
amount of repo operations helps to curb the upward trend of call money rate with a two-week 
lag. The same is true for the reverse repo operations. Bangladesh Bank performs reverse 
repo operations when the there is an easy liquidity situation and thus no evident pressure in 
the call money rate. However, as the operation is performed, it creates pressure on the call 
money rate. Both repo and reverse repo operations create their expected impact on the 
movement of the call money rate with repo operations having a two-week lag and reverse 
repo operations with a one-week lag. While both the repo and reverse operations place 
significant impact on the volatility in the overnight money market rate, the coefficient values 
suggest that repo operations have a greater impact on changes in the call money rate as 
compared with reverse repo operations.   
The error correction term came with its expected sign, which once again supports the 
equilibrium relationship between the overnight money market rate and BB's policy rate. This 
is also supportive of estimating the equation in its transformed form (equation 1). While the 
seasonal dummy is significant at 10 percent level in OLS estimation, this is not significant in 
                                                 
12  The GARCH model was introduced by Bollerslev (1986). See Palombini (2003) and Joshi (2004) for recent 
exposition on interest rate volatility using GARCH model.   
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the GARCH (1,1) estimation. An expected negative relationship with the excess reserve is 
found which is significant at 1 percent level. 
 Estimated Equation 2: Estimation using GARCH (1,1) 
Dependent Variable: DLCR 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) 
Sample(adjusted): 12/07/2002 6/16/2007 
Included observations: 237 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 130 iterations 
Variance backcast: ON 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.083 0.053 1.578 0.114 
LCR(-1)-LTR(-1) -0.325 0.035 -9.291 0.000 
LCR(-2) -0.178 0.058 -3.098 0.002 
LCR(-3) 0.219 0.057 3.865 0.000 
DLTR 2.423 0.313 7.743 0.000 
LREPI 0.014 0.002 6.064 0.000 
LREPI(-2) -0.011 0.003 -4.418 0.000 
LRREPI -0.024 0.003 -7.534 0.000 
LRREPI(-1) 0.007 0.003 2.055 0.039 
DLRE -0.089 0.019 -4.708 0.000 
DLRE(-1) -0.069 0.026 -2.632 0.008 
        Variance Equation 
C 0.000 0.000 1.229 0.219 
ARCH(1) 0.941 0.169 5.574 0.000 
GARCH(1) 0.436 0.066 6.628 0.000 
R-squared 0.331     Mean dependent var -0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.292     S.D. dependent var 0.279 
S.E. of regression 0.235     Akaike info criterion -0.615 
Sum squared resid 12.290     Schwarz criterion -0.410 
Log likelihood 86.905     F-statistic 8.496 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.858     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
Table 8: ARCH Test Result 
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 0.97     Probability 0.33 
Obs*R-squared 0.974     Probability 0.32 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This paper’s main objective has been to examine the effectiveness of central bank's 
operational policy in Bangladesh. Two important hypotheses, which have been widely 
addressed especially in the context of developed countries, are tested. One is that money 
market rates co-move in the long run and, therefore, are co-integrated. Secondly, the 
volatility in the overnight money market is linked with the monetary policy operations of BB. 
Our study results support both the views, and the results are important toward understanding 
the interest rate channel of monetary transmission, overnight money market behavior, and 
operational policy of BB.  
Regarding the adoption of various indirect operational arrangements in recent years by BB 
namely, repo and reverse repo, the empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that 
both the repo and reverse repo operations can significantly influence the movement in the 
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market clearing rates. The model presented to analyze the efficacy of the operational policy 
of BB captures the time varying nature of volatility in the call money rate, which is the first 
of its kind in Bangladesh. The results suggest that market interest rates are linked with one 
another, so that disruptions in the demand for or supply of funds at one maturity can cause 
volatility spillovers to the markets for funds at other maturities. The results further suggest 
that BB can influence the call money rate both through its conduct of the monetary policy 
and through the market structure that it creates through setting reserve requirements. 
Several important lessons emerge from the study for the market players, including the policy 
makers. The most important one is that the market-clearing rate would ultimately converge to 
the policy rate and there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two. The 
available literature suggests that if this relationship exists in the market and there is a good 
perception about this among the market players, then market participants are likely to 
incorporate this belief into their demand and, therefore, the market interest rate is not likely 
to deviate much from the central bank's policy interest rate. The credibility of the central 
bank would be further enhanced if the market participants find that operational measures of 
the central bank can effectively influence the market-clearing rate. Therefore, if any 
divergence arises for some reason, it is expected that it would be corrected soon. If such 
credibility holds, going one-step further it can be suggested that central banks can use open 
mouth operations (signaling) rather than any actual interventions to keep the market rates at a 
target level.   
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Appendix 1: Correlogram of weekly call rate (cr): January 1997-June 2007  
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       .|*****  |        .|*****  | 1 0.673 0.673 234.87 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 2 0.431 -0.041 331.31 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|*      | 3 0.380 0.193 406.30 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|*      | 4 0.368 0.086 476.99 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 5 0.299 -0.018 523.68 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 6 0.253 0.047 557.15 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 7 0.226 0.006 583.85 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|*      | 8 0.257 0.119 618.41 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 9 0.276 0.056 658.55 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 10 0.259 0.024 693.89 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 11 0.205 -0.036 716.11 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 12 0.202 0.048 737.75 0.000 
       .|*      |        *|.      | 13 0.123 -0.152 745.73 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 14 0.087 0.032 749.76 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 15 0.103 0.032 755.39 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 16 0.096 -0.026 760.35 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 17 0.036 -0.066 761.04 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 18 -0.033 -0.114 761.64 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 19 -0.096 -0.107 766.56 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 20 -0.107 -0.032 772.75 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 21 -0.126 -0.055 781.31 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 22 -0.138 -0.001 791.63 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 23 -0.162 -0.039 805.76 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 24 -0.154 -0.024 818.70 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 25 -0.127 0.035 827.46 0.000 
       *|.      |        *|.      | 26 -0.143 -0.065 838.65 0.000 
      **|.      |        *|.      | 27 -0.196 -0.063 859.52 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|.      | 28 -0.221 -0.016 886.28 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|.      | 29 -0.216 0.009 911.74 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|.      | 30 -0.205 0.008 934.71 0.000 
      **|.      |        .|.      | 31 -0.201 0.013 956.85 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|*      | 32 -0.145 0.092 968.40 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|*      | 33 -0.086 0.077 972.51 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 34 -0.044 0.075 973.56 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 35 -0.015 0.078 973.69 0.000 
       .|.      |        *|.      | 36 -0.057 -0.071 975.49 0.000 
       *|.      |        .|.      | 37 -0.085 -0.014 979.47 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|*      | 38 -0.037 0.089 980.24 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 39 0.007 0.054 980.26 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 40 -0.013 -0.041 980.35 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 41 -0.008 0.015 980.39 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 42 0.018 -0.027 980.56 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 43 0.047 0.017 981.80 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 44 0.043 -0.056 982.83 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 45 0.033 -0.025 983.43 0.000 
       .|.      |        .|.      | 46 0.062 0.055 985.60 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 47 0.094 -0.030 990.62 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|*      | 48 0.153 0.111 1004.0 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|.      | 49 0.197 0.033 1026.1 0.000 
       .|**     |        .|**     | 50 0.316 0.221 1083.5 0.000 
       .|***    |        .|.      | 51 0.352 0.031 1154.6 0.000 
       .|**     |        *|.      | 52 0.240 -0.109 1187.8 0.000 
       .|*      |        .|.      | 53 0.152 -0.051 1201.1 0.000 
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Appendix 2: Transformation of the Model in First Difference Form  
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ititttt DZrrepirepitrcrtrtrcrcr εθρϕγδβδδβα ++∑+∑+∑+∑+∑+++−+=∆ = −−== −−== −−− 0002211011 )1(  
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ititttt DZrrepirepitrcrtrtrcrcr εθρϕγδβδδδβα ++∑+∑+∑+∑+∑+++∆+−+=∆ = −−== −−== −−− 00012110011 )()1(  
or,
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Where,  
1,1 110211 −++=−= βδδλβλ and  
 
